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INTRODUCTION 
Existing writings on the conflict of laws – or conflict of laws issues – in 
the specific context of international commercial arbitration generally 
address the more practical questions of what law applies to legal issues such 
as the validity of the arbitration agreement1 or arbitrability.2  Other 
contributions analyze the ways in which international arbitrators apply 
conflict of laws rules in order to determine the applicable substantive law.3  
The purpose of this article is different.  While its scope does encompass 
actual arbitral practice with regard to the application of conflict of laws 
rules (and, more generally, choice-of-law determinations),4 the main 
objective of this study is to demonstrate how the development of 
international commercial arbitration has caused, or at least contributed to, a 
transformation of the “traditional” conflict of laws theory and of its 
methodology.5  
The traditional conflict of laws theory has for a long time been the 
subject of lively debate and heavy criticisms on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Although the approaches advocated by those critical voices are diverse and 
nuanced, they have essentially formulated two types of criticisms.  Some 
scholars have argued that the conflict of laws, due to its complex 
methodology, leads to unpredictable results and constitutes a “jump in the 
  
 1. Jean-François Poudret, Le droit applicable à la convention d’arbitrage, in ASA 
SPECIAL SERIES NO. 8, THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT —ITS MULTIFOLD CRITICAL ASPECTS 
23 (1994); Julian Lew, The Law Applicable to the Form and Substance of the Arbitration 
Clause, in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF 
APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, 1998 ICCA Congress Series No. 9 114 
(Albert Jan van den Berg, ed., 1999). 
 2. Bernard Hanotiau, What Law Governs the Issue of Arbitrability?, 12 ARB. INT’L 
391 (1996).  
 3. Ole Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, 2 ARB. INT’L 104 
(1986); Beda Wortmann, Choice of Law by Arbitrators: The Applicable Conflict of Laws 
System, 14 ARB. INT’L 97 (1998); Maniruzzaman, Conflict of Laws Issues in International 
Arbitration: Practice and Trends, 9 ARB. INT’L 371 (1993). 
 4. I distinguish between the application of conflict rules and the more general term 
“choice-of-law determination” because the former will invariably lead to the application of 
the domestic laws of a given country, while the expression “choice-of-law determination” 
includes those situations in which arbitral tribunals decide to apply a-national or 
transnational rules.   
 5. When I speak of the “traditional” conflict of laws theory, I mean the conflict of 
laws approach applied notably in Continental Europe and followed in the United States until 
the so-called conflict of laws “revolution” in the 1950’s and 60’s. This traditional approach is 
characterized, inter alia, by the strict separation between conflict rules and substantive rules, 
the bilateralism of conflict rules, equal treatment of domestic and foreign law, and the 
absence of substantive considerations in the law-selecting process. For an excellent overview 
of the differences between Continental European and American conflict of laws theory, see 
Gerhard Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the 
American Reformers, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 615 (1979). 
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dark.”6  They have notably taken issue with a number of methodological 
features of the conflict of laws such as, for example, the problem of 
characterization and the theory of renvoi.7  
Others, especially American conflict scholars, have alleged that the 
conflict of laws is “unfair” because it does not take into account the 
substance of the laws that are “in conflict,” i.e. because it is not concerned 
with achieving the most equitable or just result.8  Those authors have 
therefore argued that substantive considerations should be part of the 
choice-of-law process.  As early as 1933, Cavers had pointed out the gap 
between the theory of neutral conflict norms and actual practice, showing 
that many courts were taking account of the likely outcomes of their conflict 
of laws decisions.9  During the “conflict revolution” that occurred in the 
1950s and ‘60s, American scholars legitimized this practice by advocating a 
variety of novel approaches such as governmental interest analysis,10 the 
preference for the lex fori,11 and “better law.”12 
In addition to these two “classical” criticisms (i.e. unpredictability and 
unfairness), the conflict of laws theory has, often implicitly, been called into 
question in the specific context of international commercial relations.  
Numerous — mainly European — authors have argued that the conflict of 
laws is an inadequate method inasmuch as it leads to the application of 
domestic laws, those domestic laws being supposedly incapable of 
providing a satisfactory normative framework for international trade 
relations.13  Those arguments have nourished the debate surrounding the 
  
 6. LEO RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 90 (1955); see also KLAUS PETER 
BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 10 (1999). 
 7. See infra text accompanying note 41. 
 8. For a comprehensive examination of American criticism of the “blindness” of the 
conflict of laws,with special emphasis on the doctrines of Currie and Ehrenzweig, see 
Gerhard Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 91 (1964); Kegel, 
supra note 5. 
 9. See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. 
REV. 173, 173-208 (1933). 
 10. See generally Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: 
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1959) [hereinafter 
Currie, Constitution and Choice of Law]; see generally Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods 
and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171 (1959) [hereinafter Currie, Notes 
on Methods]; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws—Towards a 
Theory of Enterprise Liability under “Foreseeable and Insurable Laws,” 69 YALE L.J. 595 
(1960); see generally Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-Of-Law 
Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975). 
 11. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori—Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 
MICH. L. REV. 637 (1960). 
 12. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 275 (1966). 
 13. See, e.g., René David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2(5) 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 141 (1973); see BERGER, supra note 
6, at 9; Michael Pryles, Application of the Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 31 U.N.S.W.L.J. 319 (2008). 
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existence — or necessity — of an autonomous body of legal rules 
governing international commerce, also referred to as transnational law or 
lex mercatoria.14 
Despite — or because of — the fact that lex mercatoria is hotly debated 
and gives rise to sometimes passionate exchanges, the discussion presents a 
number of gaps and insufficiencies.15  First, the debate has focused on the 
controversial questions of the existence,16 “true legal nature,”17 and 
autonomy18 of lex mercatoria, and on the determination of the rules that 
form part of such a “transnational legal order.”19  Only limited attention has 
  
 14. Fundamental writings of those authors include: Goldman, Frontières du droit et 
lex mercatoria, in ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 177 (1964); Goldman, La lex 
mercatoria dans les contrats et l’arbitrage internationaux, in CLUNET 475 (1979); Goldman, 
Nouvelles réflexions sur la lex mercatoria, in ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN 
L’HONNEUR DE PIERRE LALIVE 241 (C. Dominicé, R. Patry & C. Reymond eds., 1993); Clive 
M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in CLIVE M. 
SCHMITTHOFF’S SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 3 (1988); Clive M. 
Schmitthoff, The New Sources of the Law of International Trade, at 131; Clive M. 
Schmitthoff, The law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and Operation, in THE 
SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (C. M. Schmitthoff ed., 1964); Clive M. 
Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions, in 
THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 19 (C. M. 
Schmitthoff & N. Horn eds., 1982).  See BERGER, supra note 6 (discussing how the lex 
mercatoria has given rise to an intense and sometimes passionate academic debate); see 
generally THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001); See LEX 
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION (T.E. Carbonneau ed., 1998). 
 15. See Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de la lex mercatoria, in LE DROIT DES 
RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES ETUDES OFFERTES A BERTOLD GOLDMAN 125 
(1982); Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria – Hoist with its Own Petard?, 5 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 67, 68 (2005) (stating inter alia that “early writing on the subject was characterised 
by an ideological, almost mystical zeal.”).  
 16. See Vanessa L. D. Wilkinson, The New Lex Mercatoria - Reality or Academic 
Fantasy?, 12(2) J. INT’L ARB. 103, 103-118 (1995); Stoecker, The Lex Mercatoria: To what 
Extent does it Exist?, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 101 (1990). Some authors have challenged the 
extremely widespread idea that the new lex mercatoria is a revival of its medieval 
predecessor. See, in particular, Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex 
Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21 (2005). 
 17. See Klaus Peter Berger, The relationship between the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts and the New Lex Mercatoria, 5 UNIF. L. REV. 153, 170 
(2000) (noting that in order “to prevent the discussion on [lex mercatoria] from becoming [ ] 
bogged down in a futile struggle to determine its true legal nature, it seems more appropriate 
to focus on the contract itself. After all, it is the contractual consensus between the parties 
which, in international business transactions more than in any other field of daily life, 
determines the rights and duties that parties have towards one another.”). 
 18. See Jan Paulsson, La lex mercatoria dans l’arbitrage C.C.I., 1990 REV. ARB. 55 
(1990); Michael Frischkorn, Definitions of the Lex Mercatoria and the Effects of 
Codifications on the Lex Mercatoria’s Flexibility, 7 EUR. J.L. REFORM 331 (2005); Ralf 
Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria, Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
447 (2007). 
 19. Goldman’s claim that the lex mercatoria constitutes an autonomous “legal order” 
has provoked astonishment and criticism by positivist legal writers. A particularly forceful – 
though exaggerated – critique of Goldman’s argument has been articulated by Lord Mustill. 
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been paid to the function that transnational law fulfils (or is meant to fulfill).  
Second, the debate has neglected the broader implications on the practice 
and theory of the conflict of laws.  Third, the reasons why arbitral tribunals 
have elaborated specific conflict of laws rules or methods have only been 
examined superficially — no attempts have been made at linking this 
evolution to the specific normative requirements of international business 
transactions. 
In this article, I intend to fill those gaps.  Bridging conflict of laws 
scholarship highlighting the alleged failures of the conflict of laws method 
and the lex mercatoria discussion, I aim to offer a comprehensive 
examination of the appropriateness of the conflict of laws theory in the field 
of international trade.  More specifically, I examine the validity of the three 
aforementioned criticisms (unpredictability, unfairness, substantive 
inadequacy) as applied to the particular context of international commercial 
relations and attempt to show how international commercial arbitration, 
mainly through the practice of arbitral tribunals, has been able to provide 
remedies to some of the drawbacks of the conflict of laws approach. 
In Part 1, I analyze the alleged deficiencies of the conflict of laws in the 
field of international commerce.  As far as the unpredictability and 
unfairness of the conflict of laws are concerned, I argue that those alleged 
defects may indeed be issues of concern (even though it is questionable 
whether it is at all possible to design tools to remedy such defects), and that 
it is therefore understandable that arbitral tribunals should seek to improve 
both the predictability and the fairness of their conflict of laws decisions. 
I also explain why substantive inadequacy constitutes the most striking 
and fundamental defect of the conflict of laws theory.  This particular 
shortcoming of the conflict of laws is only occasionally referred to in the 
context of the lex mercatoria debate because most authors either assume the 
existence of lex mercatoria as a means of self-regulation by international 
business operators or simply fail to investigate the function of transnational 
law.  In fact, very few writers have attempted to capture the basic 
comparative advantages of transnational law when compared to domestic 
laws.  It follows that the concept of the substantive inadequacy of domestic 
laws has rarely been explained and, to my knowledge, never has been 
satisfactorily conceptualized.  In this article, I suggest a basic explanation 
for the inappropriateness of the application of domestic laws to international 
commercial relations.  By the same token, I propose a definition of the 
underlying reason for such inappropriateness, i.e. of what is sometimes 
termed the “specific normative needs”20 of international commerce. 
  
See Lord Justice Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, in LIBER 
AMICORUM FOR LORD WILBERFORCE 149 (1987).  
 20. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of 
Decision-Making?, in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 53, 55 (Klaus Peter Berger 
ed., 2001) (discussing the substantive specificity of transnational law: “From this viewpoint 
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In Part 2, I argue that, and examine how, international commercial 
arbitration has allowed international business transactions progressively to 
elude the deficiencies of the conflict of laws.  I explain how international 
arbitral tribunals have succeeded in freeing themselves from excessively 
rigid conflict of laws rules with a view to improving, to the extent possible, 
the predictability and substantive fairness of their choice-of-law 
determinations.  Also, and most importantly, I show how those tribunals 
have managed to move towards application of transnational law in 
circumstances where the domestic laws involved provided — or where 
perceived to provide — an inadequate normative framework.  With regard 
to both trends, I analyze the crucial role played by arbitral tribunals in the 
broader context of widespread legislative policies aimed at increasing 
arbitral autonomy,21 both at the domestic and at the international level. 
I. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 
A. Unpredictability of the Conflict of Laws 
Classical critiques of the conflict of laws method have notably 
emphasized its alleged unpredictability,22 i.e. the fact that when individuals 
or entities engage in certain activities or behavior (enter into a contract, 
commit a tortuous act), it is difficult, at the time when such activities or 
behavior occur, to “predict” by what law the latter will be governed, 
especially in the context of potential litigation. 
Various factors are said to account for this lack of predictability.  The 
first such factor — and main subject of doctrinal attacks — is the excessive 
methodological complexity of the conflict of laws.23  Other factors do not 
pertain to the conflicts method itself, but rather to external causes.  Those 
are the courts’ inclination to apply the lex fori in disregard of the applicable 
conflict of laws rule (so-called lex forism) and the lack of international 
uniformity of domestic conflict of laws rules.   
  
[which Gaillard does not share] international transactions require added flexibility, which the 
requirements found in national laws would seldom accommodate. This school of thought is 
related to the theory of the specific needs of international business.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 21. On arbitral autonomy more generally, see M. PETSCHE, THE GROWING 
AUTONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2005). 
 22. See also Peter Klaus Berger, The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 943, 952 
(1997), [hereinafter Berger Mercatoria] (stating that “the classical conflict of laws 
methodology takes into account neither the interests of the parties nor general trade interests” 
and that the prevalence of conflict justice over material justice leads to “unpredictability as to 
how courts will decide a case.”). 
 23. See Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The 
Paradox of Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925 (2004). 
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The criticisms regarding the alleged unpredictability of the operation of 
the conflict of laws are certainly not entirely unfounded, although it is likely 
that the problem stems as much — if not more — from an intentional 
misapplication of conflict rules (especially lex forism) as from an alleged 
methodological “flaw.”  Also, as far as international business transactions 
are concerned, the widespread recognition of the principle of party 
autonomy (i.e. the possibility for parties to an international contract to select 
the applicable law), considerably reduces the adverse impact of 
methodological complexity, lex forism, and lack of international uniformity.  
1. Unpredictability and Functional and Methodological 
Complexity of the Conflict of Laws 
One reason why the operation of the conflict of laws may at times lead to 
surprising and thus unforeseeable results consists in its functional and 
methodological complexity.  The conflict of laws is, in fact, a very 
“technical” discipline involving the application of numerous abstract 
concepts.  As Kegel and Schurig have shown, this is due to the fact that the 
conflict of laws must take into account various, potentially contrasting, 
interests: conflict of laws interests, public interests and “interests of 
order”.24  
First of all, the conflict of laws evidently involves “conflict interests”, 
i.e. interests that relate to the very purpose of the conflict of laws, which is 
the determination of the law that most appropriately governs a given legal 
question or relationship.  In order to determine this law, party interests, 
community interests, and interests of order need to be taken into account.25  
The formulation of a conflict rule that best serves those interests ensures the 
achievement of conflict of laws “justice”.26 
Second, the conflict of laws involves so-called interests of order,27 i.e. 
interests that relate to domestic and international normative harmony and, 
more generally, to the overall coherence of a legal system.  For example, it 
is in the interest of “order” that questions such as the validity of a contract 
or of a marriage receive one identical answer, independently of which court 
or judge is seized.  Lack of normative harmony, in fact, creates legal 
  
 24. See G. KEGEL & K. SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 131 (2004). The 
authors list additional interests that play a role in the conflict of laws such as 
Verkehrsinteressen (roughly, the interests of commerce), for example. I do not mention those 
additional interests in my analysis because they do not, in my opinion, have a specific impact 
on the complexity of the conflict of laws method. 
 25. Kegel, supra note 5, at 621. 
 26. G. KEGEL & K. SCHURIG, supra note 24, at 131. I slightly distort the authors’ 
terminological distinctions. While they distinguish conflict of laws “justice” from conflict of 
laws interests (which include party interests, interests of commerce, and interests of order), I 
use the term conflict of laws interests as an equivalent of conflict of laws justice. 
 27. Id. at 139. 
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uncertainty and encourages quasi-fraudulent behavior such as, forum 
shopping.  It is thus detrimental to the overall efficient functioning of a legal 
system. 
Lastly, the conflict of laws may also involve public interests,28 i.e. the 
interests of the States whose laws are “in conflict”.  According to the 
traditional view — which is not shared by most American authors,29 
conflicts of laws do not as such involve conflicts between public interests 
and do not constitute conflicts between “sovereigns.”30  They primarily 
involve private interests, i.e. the interests of the private individuals or 
entities engaged in international activities.  Yet, public interests must be 
taken into account by the conflict of laws when the application (or 
violation) of “public policy” or mandatory norms is at stake.  Conflict of 
laws methodology needs to allow the application of such norms (especially 
those of the forum) in situations where those norms would be contravened 
by the otherwise applicable law. 
The pursuit of interests as varied as conflict of laws interests, interests of 
order, and public interests translates into a high degree of methodological 
complexity, which causes the functioning of this discipline to be disturbed 
by a number of “complicating factors.”31  First, designing a conflict of laws 
rule that faithfully reflects the notion of the “seat” of a legal relationship is a 
difficult, if not impossible, task.  This is due to the fact that a considerable 
number of factors could connect a legal question to the laws of a particular 
country and, even more importantly, to the fact that the choice of a 
particular connecting factor will, to some extent, always be arbitrary 
(because an international contract will by definition always be connected to 
more than one country).32  In the field of international contracts, the conflict 
of laws rules are thus often deliberately vague and call for further 
refinement in the judicial process. 
Even under an accomplishment instrument such as the Rome Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, conflict rules are vague.  
Indeed, under the Convention, absent a choice-of-law by the parties, the 
applicable law is the law of the country to which the contract bears the 
“closest connection.”33  This general principle laid down by the Convention 
  
 28.  Id. at 148. 
 29. See infra text accompanying note 60. 
 30. See, e.g., Kegel, supra note 5, at 631(arguing that, “in private law, which the 
State promotes for justice between individuals, the State does not pursue aims of its own, but 
only acts as patron: To speak here of governmental interests only misleads. Rather, State and 
private interests are fundamentally different”); see also PIERRE MAYER, DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 53 (1977). Mayer explains that it was only until the end of the 18th 
century that conflicts of laws and conflicts of jurisdiction were commonly regarded as 
conflicts between sovereigns.  
 31. MAYER, supra note 30, at 146. 
 32. David, supra note 13, at 141. 
 33. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980 
(90/934/EEC), Article 4(1) [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
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— which is of course not a workable rule — is supplemented by the 
presumption according to which a contract is most closely connected to the 
country of the party whose performance is “characteristic” of the contract.34  
While the characteristic performance test does provide some degree of 
precision, it does not usefully apply to complex contractual settings devoid 
of a characteristic performance.35  Also, under the Convention, courts are 
authorized to disregard the characteristic-performance rule and apply 
another, more closely connected, law.36 
Second, turning to the actual application of conflict rules, difficult 
questions of characterization may arise.37  It is, for example, debatable 
whether the question of the validity of a contract entered into by a person 
allegedly lacking the necessary capacity should be characterized as a 
question relating to contracts or, alternatively, as pertaining to the category 
of legal capacity.  Depending on the view taken, this question will be 
governed either by the lex contractus or by the personal law (which may be 
either the law of the person’s nationality or of its domicile).38  Similar issues 
of characterization may be raised with respect to other questions such as, for 
example, the validity of articles of association.39 
Third, once the law applicable to an international contract has been 
designated by the relevant conflict of laws rule, the application of such law 
may encounter obstacles deriving from the need to preserve interests of 
order.  One tool to ensure such “order” and, more specifically, international 
normative harmony, consists in the renvoi.  Under this principle, a judge, 
rather than “automatically” applying the law designated by the forum’s 
conflict of laws rule (law A), will examine the conflict of laws norms of that 
particular law.  If those conflict norms differ from those of the forum, i.e. if 
they designate a different law (law B or the law of the forum), then the 
judge will follow the foreign conflict rule and apply that particular law.40  
Predictability of the operation of conflict of laws rules thus requires not 
  
 34. Id.  art. 4(2). 
 35. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 13 where the author explains that the application of 
conflict of laws criteria (such as the characteristic performance test) may be problematic in 
relation to complex contracts such as swap contracts, barter or countertrade transactions, 
letters of intent, and multilateral netting arrangements. 
 36. Rome Convention, supra note 33, art. 4(5). 
 37. According to Berger, “[t]he methodological uncertainties and frictions are 
particularly relevant with respect to the different approaches taken by domestic courts and 
doctrine to the issue of ‘qualification’ or ‘classification’ of the notions and terms used in the 
domestic laws of international private law.” See Berger, supra note 22, at 953. 
 38. See Cavers, supra note 9, at 179. 
 39. H. VAN HOUTTE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 18 (1995) (considering the 
applicability of either the lex societatis or the lex contractus). 
 40. It should be observed that the renvoi does not always improve normative 
harmony:  while it does so in cases where the conflict rules of the designated law refer to the 
laws of a third country (Weiterverweisung), it fails to accomplish this objective where those 
conflict rules refer back to the laws of the forum (Rueckverweisung). 
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only knowledge of the forum’s conflict of laws norms, but also familiarity 
with the conflict norms of the country whose laws are applicable under 
those rules.  It is thus understandable that various writers have expressed 
concern with the detrimental impact of the renvoi on predictability.41  
Today, in the area of international contracts, the renvoi is excluded under a 
number of domestic laws and international conventions,42 but it continues to 
be applied in a number of jurisdictions. 
Another tool to ensure normative order consists of the so-called 
“adaptation” of the forum’s conflict of laws rules.43  Such an adaptation may 
be necessary when the combined application of the forum’s law and a 
foreign law to related legal questions leads to a result that contrasts with the 
overall solution that would have resulted from the application of either of 
the laws in conflict, and that thus contravenes the legislative policies of 
both.44  To avoid such undesirable outcomes, one can adapt either the 
relevant conflict of laws norm or, alternatively, the material rule that leads 
to the incoherent result.  Regardless of the approach followed, adaptation 
impacts the predictability of the functioning of the conflict of laws. 
Fourth and lastly, public interests may interfere with the operation of the 
conflict of laws.  On the one hand, it may be appropriate, under specific 
circumstances, to apply certain mandatory norms contained in a foreign law 
(i.e. a law different from the otherwise applicable law).  On the other hand, 
certain norms of an applicable foreign law, or the legal situation generated 
by their application, may contravene the forum’s public policy, and may 
thus have to be discarded.  Since the notion of public policy is inherently 
vague, and since, in addition, an a priori identification of potentially 
applicable mandatory norms proves difficult, the application of these 
concepts inevitably affects the predictability of the conflict of laws method. 
  
 41. Jean Robert, De la règle de conflit a la règle matérielle en matière d’arbitrage 
international (spécialement en droit international privé français), in THE ART OF 
ARBITRATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Jan C. Schuktsz & Albert Jan Van 
Den Berg eds., 1982) (observing that “the renvoi is problematic because it is source of 
uncertainty and, moreover, unpredictability of the law that will finally be applied to a factual 
situation occurring in the forum” (translation by the author)).  
 42. See Rome Convention, supra note 33, art. 15. 
 43. See G. KEGEL & K. SCHURIG, supra note 24, at 357.  
 44. A classical example is provided by the question of the patrimonial rights of the 
surviving spouse: while the laws of country A only provide for marital rights and not for 
succession rights, the laws of country B grant the surviving spouse mere succession rights, 
thereby excluding marital rights. The combined application of the two laws can lead either to 
entirely exclude all patrimonial rights or, on the contrary, to allocate both marital and 
succession rights to the surviving spouse. Both results are contrary to the interests of order 
inasmuch as they lead to incoherent and undesirable situations. 
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2. Unpredictability and Court Practice: The Problem of Lex 
Forism 
While methodological complexity is inherent in the conflict of laws 
approach as such, other factors diminishing the predictability of the 
operation of the conflict of laws are external.  One such factor is lex forism.  
The term lex forism refers to an “undue” preference for the lex fori.  This 
occurs when courts apply the lex fori in violation of the forum’s conflict 
norms (judicial lex forism) or when the conflict norms themselves provide 
for an unduly “extensive” application of the forum’s laws (legislative lex 
forism).  
Judicial lex forism may result from various factors, including the court’s 
unawareness of the existence of a conflict of laws issue (generally 
associated with lack of relevant argument by the parties), the court’s 
insufficient knowledge of the applicable foreign law (“it is better rightly to 
apply the forum’s law than wrongly to apply a foreign law”), and the belief 
that the domestic law is better than, or “superior” to, the conflicting foreign 
law.  When applying the lex fori to the detriment of the otherwise applicable 
foreign law, courts frequently have recourse to one (or several) of the 
various methodological tools of the conflict of laws (characterization, 
renvoi, public policy, mandatory norms etc.), which allow them to 
“manipulate” the outcome of the choice-of-law process.45 
When lex forism does not operate in the “shadow of the law”, but is 
openly displayed by a legal system, one can speak of “legislative” lex 
forism.  Legislative lex forism is thus inherent to the forum’s conflict of 
laws rules and reflects a legislative policy favoring the application of 
domestic laws46 to varying extents.  Under a particularly exaggerated form, 
lex forism refers to the principle according to which a court should generally 
apply its own law, unless exceptional circumstances justify the application 
of a foreign law — a theory that has most famously been argued by 
Ehrenzweig.47  The principled application of the lex fori in international 
settings constitutes, of course, a rejection of the conflict of laws discipline 
  
 45. See Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1631, 1633 (2005) (summarizing the works of the American legal realists regarding choice-
of-law, Weinberg observes that “judges only professed to be complying with the command 
of inexorable bright-line rules” and that “[i]nevitably, [they] were manipulating the 
seemingly fixed rules to produce desired results”). 
 46. It is generally reflected by the unilateralism of conflict of laws rules. 
 47. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 11, at 637.  A number of American scholars have 
expressed views similar to those of Ehrenzweig; see also Currie, Constitution and Choice of 
Law, supra note 10, at 9 (arguing that “[n]ormally, even in cases involving foreign factors, a 
court should as a matter of course look to the law of the forum as the source of the rule of 
decision”). If the doctrine of lex fori is most famously associated with Ehrenzweig, it must be 
noted that it has been argued as early as in the end of the 19th century; see James M. Kerr, 
The Doctrine of Lex Fori, 27 CENT. L.J. 255 (1888). 
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as such.48 It has never been the prevailing doctrinal view, nor a theory 
“officially” endorsed by courts or law-makers. 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which courts engage in lex forism, 
largely because it is difficult to distinguish between due and undue 
application of domestic law.  However, most authors concur that lex forism 
forms part of the reality of judicial decision-making,49 although judicial 
attitudes may vary greatly from one court to another.  Regardless of the 
actual extent to which domestic courts — or legislators — are guilty of lex 
forism, their preference for their domestic laws inevitably undermines the 
predictability of the functioning of the conflict of laws.  In fact, judicial lex 
forism contrasts with the parties’ legitimate expectations as based on 
conflict of laws legislation and doctrine.  Legislative lex forism, while less 
unpredictable, may nevertheless be surprising because the relevant conflict 
norms will often differ from conflict norms applied at the international 
level. 
3. Unpredictability and Lack of International Uniformity of 
Conflict Rules 
Another external factor that potentially diminishes the predictability of 
the conflict of laws is the lack of uniformity of conflict rules at the 
international level.50  Being domestic in nature, conflict rules may indeed 
vary from one country to the other.  Disputes arising in connection with a 
particular international transaction may potentially be brought before the 
courts of several countries.51  Those courts may, therefore, apply different 
  
 48. Even Ehrenzweig admits that his approach calls into question the very existence 
of the conflict of laws as an independent branch of the law. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The 
Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws –Exception or Rule?, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 13, 14 (1960) 
(stating that “the law of conflict of laws, while there is a great and increasing need for 
teaching it, is not a legal subject at all, at least not a subject which can be independently 
stated or restated”); see also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A 
“Restatement” of the “Lex Fori Approach”, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965). 
 49. The view that lex forism is particularly widespread is taken notably by Carter. 
With regard to the practice of English courts, he notes that “an impartial observer surveying 
the overall operation in practice of purported choice of law could scarcely avoid being struck 
by the paucity of cases in which the eventual outcome has been that a law other than the lex 
fori has actually been applied.” P.B. Carter, Choice of Law: Methodology or Mythology?, in 
ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN L’HONNEUR DE PIERRE LALIVE 11, 16 (C. Dominicé et 
al. eds., 1993). 
 50. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, 60 
LA. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2000) (stating that “private international law rules differ widely 
from state to state, as the variations between recent European conflicts codifications 
demonstrate. . . . Hence it cannot be predicted with any confidence what substantive law will 
be held to control a given dispute”). 
 51. This is due to the fact that, in contractual matters, the laws of many countries 
provide that both the courts of the defendant and the courts of the place of performance have 
jurisdiction.  See e.g., Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (Brussels), art. 2(1), 5(1), Sept. 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 153; 8 
 
2010] Int'l Commercial Arbitration and Transformation of Conflict of Laws 465 
 
conflict of laws rules, with the result that different substantive laws will be 
applicable.52 
The lack of international uniformity of conflict rules thus adversely 
affects the predictability of the operation of the conflict of laws and opens 
the door to forum-shopping.  In order to achieve greater predictability and to 
avoid such “fraudulent” behavior, several international institutions seek to 
promote the international unification of conflict of laws rules.53  Those 
efforts have led to a number of achievements,54 but major discrepancies in 
the conflict of laws rules of the various countries remain a reality. 
4. Unpredictability and Party Autonomy 
The laws of virtually all countries recognize the principle of party 
autonomy in the field of private international law, i.e. the possibility for 
parties to a contract to choose the applicable law,55 subject to minor 
limitations.  One could, therefore, assume that the predictability of the 
conflict of laws no longer is an issue.  Neither its methodological 
complexity, nor the courts’ lex forism, nor the lack of international 
uniformity seems to be able to affect the parties’ choice of the applicable 
law. 
This is true only to a certain extent.  First of all, party autonomy only 
offers the possibility of selecting the applicable law; it does not imply that 
most, let alone all, parties to an international transaction do in fact express a 
  
I.L.M. 229 (1969);  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (Lugano), art. 2(1), 5(1) Sept.16, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) (now 
Council Regulation 44/2001 of Dec. 22, 2000). 
 52. The courts of country A may, for example, apply the law of the country where 
the party that “is to effect the characteristic performance” is established (which is the rule set 
forth in Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention), while the courts of country B may apply the 
law of the country where the contract was entered into or where the contract is, or was, to be 
performed. 
 53. The most prominent of these institutions is the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, which was convened for the first time in 1893 and recognized by 
multilateral treaty in 1951. See generally Statute of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, adopted Oct. 31, 1951, 15 U.S.T. 2228, 220 U.N.T.S. 121 (July 15, 1955).  
 54. See generally Georges A.L. Droz, A Comment on the Role of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994). For an 
updated list of Conventions adopted by the Hague Conference, see the Conference’s website, 
www.hcch.net (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). 
 55. See generally SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE END OF THE 
20TH CENTURY: PROGRESS OR REGRESS? 38–40 (1999) (demonstrating that party autonomy is 
followed by virtually all major legal systems).  See also Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the 
Individual from Battles Between States: Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 381, 385 (2008); Robert Johnston, Party Autonomy in Contracts 
Specifying Foreign Law, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 37 (1966); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy 
in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic 
Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 153 (E. Gottschalk et al. eds., 
2007) [hereinafter Rühl, Party Autonomy]. 
466 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:3 
 
choice-of-law.56  Second, the actual scope of party autonomy is subject to 
two limitations.  On the one hand, the parties’ choice of the applicable law 
does not have the effect of excluding the application of relevant mandatory 
or public policy norms.  On the other hand, the law selected by the parties 
does not apply to all issues arising in connection with their agreement since, 
under the conflict rules of many countries, the parties’ choice of law does 
not extend to the formal validity of the contract.57 
This being said, in practice, the principle of party autonomy considerably 
improves the predictability of the conflict of laws.58  According to a number 
of authors, the inclusion of choice-of-law clauses is becoming increasingly 
frequent.59  Also, the law chosen by the parties will govern the vast majority 
of issues that may potentially give rise to disputes (material validity, 
interpretation, performance, liability).  To the extent that parties select the 
applicable law, predictability thus constitutes a minor defect of the 
functioning of the conflict of laws.  However, in those instances where the 
parties fail to determine the applicable law, it remains a genuine concern. 
B. Unfairness of the Conflict of Laws 
A criticism voiced in particular by American scholars relates to the 
alleged unfairness of the conflict of laws.60  This unfairness supposedly 
results from the fact that the conflict of laws’ sole purpose is the 
determination of the spatially, not substantively, most appropriate law.  The 
conflict of laws is, in fact, based on bilateral conflict norms (which ensure 
equal treatment of domestic and foreign law) formulating connecting factors 
that establish a “geographical” link between the legal situation at stake and 
a particular country.  The applicable law is thus determined without the 
substance of the laws in conflict being taken into account, i.e. the conflict of 
laws is “neutral” vis-à-vis the laws in conflict. 
  
 56. See e.g., Gerald Aksen, The Law Applicable in International Arbitration—
Relevance of Reference to Trade Usages, in PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION 
PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 475 (Albert Jan van 
den Berg ed., 1996). 
 57. Some countries follow the principle locus regit actum with regard to the formal 
validity of a contract. 
 58. See Fassberg, supra note 15, at 77. 
 59. Yves Derains, Transnational Law in ICC Arbitration, in THE PRACTICE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 48 (2001) (“[d]uring the last twenty years we have seen that, to an 
increasing extent, the parties decide what will be the law applicable to their contract.”).  
 60. See supra text accompanying note 29.  See also Rühl, Party Autonomy, supra 
note 55, at 153 (explaining that “the American Conflict of Laws Revolution… paved the way 
for a variety of novel approaches focusing on flexibility and fairness in individual cases”); 
see David F. Cavers et al., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in 
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1229 (1963) (noting that author Cavers believes a 
departure from the lex loci delicti rule is “likely to attain a much closer approximation to 
justice”) [hereinafter Babcock]. 
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According to the traditional view, this disregard for the actual contents of 
the laws in conflict is essential to ensure the uniform application of conflict 
of laws rules.  In fact, if substantive considerations were to play a role in the 
choice-of-law process, then the determination of the applicable law would 
be conditioned upon the comparison of potential outcomes, which would 
render the conflict of laws totally unforeseeable.  The neutrality of the 
conflict of laws is also indispensable for the pursuit of conflict of laws 
“justice.”  In fact, according to the traditional understanding, conflict of 
laws justice prevails over material justice.61  Justice requires the application 
of the rules that achieve the fairest result in terms of spatial, not of material, 
justice, i.e. it requires the application of the spatially most appropriate law.  
In the 1950s and 60s, American criticisms of the “blindness”62 and 
“mechanical” nature63 of the conflict of laws method have found expression 
in various doctrines such as governmental interest analysis64 and choice-
influencing considerations.65  To some extent, this introduction of 
substantive considerations into the operation of the conflict of laws method 
merely confirmed and further supported a widespread practice of 
“manipulation” of conflict rules.66  That this result-oriented use of conflict 
rules represents, even today, the prevailing doctrinal view is suggested, inter 
alia, by the anecdotal fact that American conflict scholars continue to 
perceive the various methodological subtleties of the conflict of laws, which 
  
 61. G. KEGEL & K. SCHURIG, supra note 24, at 131. 
 62. Kegel, supra note 5, at 617 (observing that American Conflict of law scholars 
“find it odd to determine “blindly” which law to apply, instead of testing first of all what the 
substantive rules of the relevant laws look like”). 
 63. See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 9, at 194–95 (stating that “[t]he mechanical rule 
radically restricts the range of facts pertinent to its application, and only as to problems 
susceptible of mechanical disposition is its employment justified. Where, as in choice-of-law 
cases, the problem is essentially complex, the rules developed must contain variables to 
permit some degree of accommodation to those complexities whose precise nature cannot be 
anticipated.”). 
 64. See generally Currie, Constitution and Choice of Law, supra note 10; see also 
Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws—A Reply to Professor Currie, 
27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960) (Probably the first and most famous case applying this 
analysis is Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 although 
there seems to be some “hesitation” among American scholars on whether the court actually 
applies a governmental interest analysis);  see Babcock, supra note 60, at 1235 (noting that 
author Currie believes governmental interest analysis renders the conflict of laws fairer by 
diminishing undesirable methodological complexity and allowing for proper laws to be 
applied); see generally Currie, Notes on Methods, supra note 10.  For an illuminating critique 
of the governmental interests analysis based on the fact that private law does not involve any 
public or governmental interests, see Kegel, supra note 5, at 631–32. 
 65. Leflar, supra note 12, at 282 (listing five such choice-influencing factors. At least 
three of those imply that courts take into account the substance of the laws concerned. They 
are: simplification of the judicial task, advancement of the forum’s governmental interests, 
and application of the better rule of law.). 
 66. See Cavers, supra note 9, at 207–08; see also Lando, supra note 3, at 106 
(describing the doctrine of Cavers). 
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their European counterparts consider as a reflection of its complex 
functions, as mere “escape devices,” allowing judges to elude the 
application of ill-suited laws.67 
Whether under the heading of governmental interests, better law68 or 
even the most significant relationship test, American conflict scholars have 
argued the necessity of looking at the substance of the laws in conflict and 
comparing potential outcomes as part of the law-selecting process.  
Although those doctrinal developments originated from the perceived 
inadequacy of systematically applying the lex loci in tort cases,69 they have 
influenced conflict of laws theory and practice beyond the field of tort law.  
It is, for example, not uncommon to find references to governmental 
interests in contract cases.70  Similarly, Leflar’s choice-influencing 
considerations, which comprise several “substantive” considerations, are of 
general applicability and not restricted to situations involving torts.  
It is difficult to assess whether, and to what extent, those doctrinal 
developments in the United States have contributed to increasing the 
fairness of the conflict of laws.71  It is in fact questionable whether the 
introduction of considerations of substantive fairness in the conflict of laws 
process is, at all, “fair” or desirable.  Indeed, it is difficult not to be 
convinced by Kegel’s masterful demonstration of the prevalence of conflict 
of laws justice over material justice and the intellectual strength of his 
analysis.72  
However, even Kegel & Schurig admit that substantive considerations 
come into play and override conflict of laws interests when the forum’s 
public policy is a stake.73  Those considerations are thus not entirely foreign 
  
 67. This is the general view expressed in most leading textbooks on the conflict of 
laws. See, for example, PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES AND MATERIALS 494 
(11th ed. 2000) (labeling characterization, renvoi and public policy as escape devices).  
 68. One of the advocates of the better rule of law “doctrine” is Leflar. In fact, his 
choice-influencing considerations include the application of the better rule of law. For a 
critical examination of this approach, see Gary J. Simson, Resisting the Allure of Better Rule 
of Law, 52 ARK. L. REV. 141 (1999). 
 69. See Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 64. 
 70. LUTHER MCDOUGAL ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 517 (5th ed. 2001). 
 71. Kegel accepts the idea that American conflict scholars may have contributed to 
rendering the conflict of laws more “fair.”  See Kegel, supra note 5, at 633 (stating that 
American scholarship “represents an architectural accomplishment of high rank, erected out 
of love for justice and with frequently illuminating clarity and unsurpassed fairness”) 
(emphasis added). 
 72. However, some — even European — authors argue that the pursuit of material 
justice by the conflict of laws is economically efficient. See Giesela Rühl, Methods and 
Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801 
(2006). 
 73. G. KEGEL & K. SCHURIG, supra note 24, at 632 (stating that the “exception of 
ordre public, which precludes the application of foreign law lagging insupportably behind 
one’s own impressions of substantive private-law justice, justifies itself by regarding justice 
as indivisible: even if conflicts justice has preference on principle, it must retreat in serious 
cases behind substantive justice”). 
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to the traditional Continental European understanding of the conflict of laws 
method.  It could be argued that, to some extent, American scholars only 
advocate a more extensive application of the forum’s notions of substantive 
fairness.  While European scholars support substituting the lex fori for the 
applicable foreign law only in “extreme” cases, American conflict lawyers 
favor such an approach whenever (they believe that) serious policy 
considerations are at stake. 
Although it is neither my task, nor my intention, to express a preference 
for either of those approaches, it must be borne in mind that, in actual 
practice, many courts do take into account considerations of substantive 
fairness, and not only in jurisdictions where those considerations officially 
form part of the choice-of-law process.  Such a practice is notably reflected 
by widespread lex forism and extensive recourse to the public policy 
exception.  If courts sometimes struggle with potentially “unfair” outcomes 
of the conflict of laws, it is understandable that arbitrators should face 
similar situations in which they might be tempted to alter traditional conflict 
of laws rules in order to render “fairer” decisions.  
C. Substantive Inadequacy of Domestic Laws 
In their critiques of the traditional conflict of laws method, American 
scholars have placed emphasis on its unpredictability and unfairness.  They 
have struggled with the “blindness” of the conflict method and faced 
problems of predictability largely as a result of their own courts’ practice of 
“escaping” undesirable outcomes.  European writers, on the other hand, 
have focused their attention on the operation of the conflict of laws in the 
specific context of international commercial transactions.  They have 
identified the substantive inadequacy of domestic laws, i.e. their inability to 
respond to the specific normative requirements of international business 
transactions, as the main drawback of the conflict of laws method. 
1. The Existence of Specific Normative Needs of International 
Commercial Relationships 
The existence of specific normative needs of international commerce has 
been argued by a number of scholars, including legal comparativists such as 
David,74 the founders of the new lex mercatoria doctrine Schmitthoff and 
Goldman,75 the new generation of lex mercatorists led by Berger76 and 
arbitration experts such as Goode,77 Pryles78 and, to some extent, Gaillard.79  
  
 74. David, supra note 13. 
 75. See supra note 14. 
 76. See BERGER, supra note 6; THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Klaus Peter 
Berger ed., 2001). 
 77. Roy Goode, The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 17 ARB. INT’L 19 (2001).  
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However, surprisingly few attempts have been made at defining what those 
needs consist of.  In fact, most authors do not expressly address or argue the 
existence of such specific needs, but implicitly base their claims on their 
existence. 
All of these authors agree on the necessity of establishing a uniform and 
autonomous legal framework governing international business transactions.  
However, they do not always clearly indicate why uniformity and autonomy 
are vital for the law of international commerce.  Some scholars emphasize 
normative requirements that are not genuinely specific to international 
commercial relations.  Schmitthoff, for example, puts the need for legal 
certainty and predictability in the forefront.80  However, as I show below, 
predictability is not a concern that is “specific” to international commercial 
relations, even though international commercial transactions may indeed 
require a higher degree of predictability.  
Other writers primarily stress the difficulty of determining the 
appropriate domestic law.  David, for example, observes that the application 
of a domestic law to “a relationship which is ex hypotesi international” is 
“arbitrary.”81  Again others address what I term the “substantive 
inadequacy” of domestic laws.  They note the existence of a basic 
contradiction between the international nature of an international 
commercial transaction and the domestic nature of the governing law 
Berger, for instance, claims that the application of domestic laws to 
international commercial transactions constitutes the “dilemma” of 
international trade law since the “natural territorial limitation of the 
principles and rules contained in domestic laws” leads to an undesirable 
“nationalization of international commercial cases.”82  
Berger’s argument is based on the observation that domestic laws, 
designed to apply to domestic legal relationships, potentially unduly restrict 
party autonomy.  The reasons for this include, according to Berger, the fact 
that domestic laws contain a large number of rules protecting weaker 
parties, the inability of domestic laws to “keep pace with the development 
and fast evolution as well as the high degree of specialization of 
  
 78. Pryles, supra note 13. 
 79. See generally Emmanuel Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the 
Discriminating Application of Transnational Rules, 10 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INVEST. L. J. 
208 (1995). 
 80. Schmitthoff, The Law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and 
Operation, supra note 14, at 15:  “One of the difficulties in the transaction of international 
trade is that, owing to its connection with several municipal jurisdictions, it lacks the 
certainty which is widely regarded as essential for a sound legal order.”  See also, 
Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, supra note 14, at 33, where 
the author explains that the autonomous law merchant constitutes a means of conflict 
avoidance.  
 81. David, supra note 13, at 141. 
 82. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 9. 
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international commerce,”83 and restrictive case law.84  Similarly to Berger, 
Goode also believes that the undue limitation of party autonomy constitutes 
the main defect of the application of domestic laws to international 
transactions.85 
2. The Conceptualization of the Specific Needs of International 
Commerce 
While numerous writers have stressed the inappropriateness of applying 
domestic laws to international transactions, most authors refrain from 
questioning this basic fact — or assumption — any further.  The discussion 
therefore lacks an attempt to offer a conceptualization of the specific needs 
of international business transactions.  I will attempt to fill this gap by 
investigating the concept of “internationality” of international transactions, 
which triggers those specific needs.  On the basis of this analysis, I argue 
that the specific normative needs of international commercial relationships 
consist of two simple, but nevertheless fundamental, requirements: 
substantive neutrality and — as others have suggested — party autonomy. 
In order to determine the specific normative requirements of 
international commerce, it is necessary to have a precise understanding of 
“internationality.”  Internationality is a key-concept in the context of 
conflict of laws,86 uniform law87 and arbitration88 conventions, and domestic 
laws specifically applying to international transactions.  The definitions 
contained in those instruments are thus of particular interest.  They suggest 
that the internationality of a legal relationship can be defined either by 
reference to party-related criteria (such as domicile, residence or 
nationality),by reference to transaction-related criteria (the performance of 
the transaction “transcends” national boundaries),89 or both.  The former are 
  
 83. Id. at 16. 
 84. Id. at 15. 
 85. Goode, supra note 77, at 21 (“Why . . . should parties to an international contract 
be locked into a national law that in all probability was designed primarily for domestic 
transactions?”). 
 86. See, e.g., Rome Convention, supra note 33; Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Agency, art. 1, Mar, 14, 1998, 16 I.L.M. 775 (1977); 26 A.J.C.L. 438; Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art.  1, Dec. 22, 1986, 24 
I.L.M. 1575 (1985). 
 87. See, e.g., Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, art. 1, Feb. 
17, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 249 (1983); CISG, art. 2, Feb.17, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 249 (1983). 
 88. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 
1(3), Dec. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985). 
 89. A useful example of a transaction-related definition of internationality is 
provided by Article 1492 of the French N.C.P.C.  According to this provision, an arbitration 
is “international” when it involves the interests of international trade.  In practice, this 
criterion will be met when the underlying transaction entails a transfer of goods, services or 
funds across national boundaries. 
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often referred to as “legal” criteria of internationality, the latter as 
“economic” criteria. 
Understanding the distinction between party-related internationality and 
transaction-related internationality is crucial because the two types of 
internationality give rise to different normative needs (even if, in practice, a 
relationship that satisfies one definition of internationally usually also 
satisfies the other one).  Party-oriented internationality creates expectations 
of substantive neutrality, a concept that I will define below.  In addition, 
both types of internationality generate a need for increased party autonomy. 
When a legal relationship satisfies party-related criteria of 
internationality, i.e. when the parties are domiciled or resident in two 
different countries, or when they are nationals of two different countries, 
they “belong to” different legal systems and operate under different laws.  
When those parties enter into an agreement, the selection of the applicable 
law will often be an issue that cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner.  
Indeed, each party has an understandable preference for the application of 
its “own” law (because it is familiar with such law and because the 
operation of that law is largely predictable),90 but at least one party will have 
to consent to the application of a foreign law.  However, it is possible that 
none of the parties agrees to have the transaction subjected to the law of the 
other party and that, therefore, the parties select the laws of a third country, 
or altogether fail to select the applicable law.91  Those difficulties are due to 
the fact that an international transaction requires neutrality of the applicable 
law, i.e. substantive neutrality.92 
It is worth noting that substantive neutrality does not relate to the actual 
content or intrinsic “qualities” of the law chosen by the parties.  Substantive 
neutrality does not, in fact, suppose that the law chosen by the parties 
achieves the best possible balance between the parties’ respective rights, 
obligations, or interests.  Substantive neutrality could have such a meaning 
  
 90. The parties’ unwillingness to have their contract governed by the other party’s 
law is particularly marked in State contracts, for example contracts concluded by a private 
and a State or State-owned party. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 3, at 371. (“The parties to 
an international contract sometimes fail to reach agreement as to the substantive law 
applicable to any dispute that may arise during the course of their contractual relationship. 
This phenomenon is noticed more often than not in the context of state contracts.”). 
 91. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View, 6 ARB. INT’L 133, 
146 (1990) (stating that “agreements without a choice of law clause are common in my 
experience”). 
 92. See Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the 
Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT’L L.J. 317, 
330 (1984) [hereinafter Cremades & Plehn].  See also Carlo Croff, The Applicable Law in an 
International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 THE INT’L 
LAWYER 613, 623 (1982) (stating that when parties reach the stage of selecting the applicable 
law, “they face an insurmountable barrier. They come from different countries with divergent 
economic and political backgrounds and therefore they are not acquainted with and do not 
confide in the respective national laws. In this situation parties prefer to leave the issue open 
rather than not to conclude the contract”). 
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but the determination of the ways in which the application of a particular 
law favors the interests of one party (for example, the distributor rather than 
the manufacturer) is difficult, if not impossible (given, in particular, that it is 
not possible to foresee the issue/s that will give rise to litigation or 
arbitration).  Substantive neutrality does not therefore refer to the parties’ 
equal “rights” under the applicable law, but to the fact that the parties have 
equal knowledge of such law and predictability of the legal consequences.  
However, even the criteria of knowledge and familiarity may be overly 
rational, considering that contracting parties often ignore the precise 
contents of their “own” law (although their lawyers generally do not).  
Substantive neutrality therefore comprises a significant psychological 
aspect, i.e. the fact that parties feel “comfortable” with the application of a 
particular law (generally their “own” law) and that they believe that such 
law will guarantee adjudicatory fairness. 
In addition, both party-related internationality and transaction-related 
internationality create a need for increased party autonomy.  Whether it is 
the parties that “belong” to different legal systems or the transaction that 
involves the territories of more than one country, in each case the 
transaction will require an increased degree of party autonomy.  When I say 
“require,” I mean that, on the hand, such increased party autonomy is 
desirable from the point of view of the parties and, on the other hand, 
acceptable from the perspective of the legislator. 
It is desirable from the point of view of the parties because domestic 
laws, due to their focus on domestic legal relationships,93 often fail to take 
account of the specificity of international transactions.  In my opinion, 
domestic laws may contain three types of problematic limitations of the 
parties’ freedom of contract.  First, domestic laws may restrict the parties’ 
right to address issues that only arise in the international context.  Focusing 
on domestic transactions, those laws may, for example, not accept, or 
restrict, the parties’ right to select the applicable substantive law, the 
parties’ right to select the competent forum or submit to arbitration,94 and 
the parties’ right to choose the currency of payment or stipulate specific 
payment clauses (for example, gold clauses).95 
Second, domestic laws may interfere with the parties’ ability to design a 
contractual framework that suits so-called “complex” contracts (such as 
turnkey agreements, technology transfers, mining concessions and joint 
  
 93. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 15; JOACHIM G. FRICK, ARBITRATION AND COMPLEX 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 14 (2001) (making specific reference to the German BGB and 
the Swiss Code des Obligations). 
 94. In France, for example, arbitration clauses were traditionally prohibited in 
domestic contracts. In the 1930’s, failing legislative enactments specifically authorizing 
recourse to arbitration in relation to international contracts, the Cour de cassation ruled that 
the prohibition did not apply to international contracts. See PETSCHE, supra note 21, at 139.   
 95. See Russell L. Post & Charles H. Willard, The Power of Congress to Nullify Gold 
Clauses, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1933). 
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ventures, for example),96 which are concluded with increasing frequency at 
the international level.  Due to the fact that the laws of most countries focus 
on “discrete” (exchange), rather than “relational” contracts, the relevant 
rules may be inappropriate in the context of complex international contracts.  
It may, therefore, be necessary for the parties to fill certain legislative gaps 
or to expressly exclude inadequate provisions (such as the general 
cancellation right in cases of default).97 
Third, domestic laws may unduly interfere with the contractual balance 
established by the parties’ agreement.  As Berger rightly points out, 
domestic laws governing contracts frequently incorporate rules aimed at the 
protection of weaker parties (consumers, tenants, employees etc.).98  Many 
of those rules may not directly apply to commercial contracts, but they 
nevertheless create a legislative climate prone to court interference.  
Moreover, the resulting restrictive case law may be applicable to 
international contracts since it forms part of the domestic law.99  
Increased party autonomy is not only desirable for the parties, but it is 
also acceptable from the point of view of the State.  First of all, business 
transactions do not as such involve public or regulatory interests; they 
primarily involve private interests.100  Second, while domestic legislators 
have a legitimate interest in regulating activities occurring in their territories 
and/or involving their nationals, they understandably have a more limited 
interest in having their laws govern activities that involve foreign elements.  
This is reflected by the public international law principle according to which 
a State’s sphere of legislative competence is defined by reference to its 
territory and its nationals.101  An international commercial transaction does 
not, therefore, fall within the exclusive sphere of competence of any State, 
such competence being shared between the States that bear a connection to 
said transaction. 
3. The Inability of Domestic Laws to Respond to the Specific 
Needs of International Commerce 
Domestic laws generally fail to respond to the specific needs of 
international commercial transactions.  However, domestic laws could be 
more responsive to those needs.  Indeed, nothing prevents domestic 
legislators from adopting rules or laws specifically applying to international 
transactions.  In practice, such an approach is reflected by dualistic 
  
 96. See FRICK, supra note 93. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See BERGER supra note 6, at 15. 
 99. Id. at 16. 
 100. Kegel, supra note 5, at 631. 
 101. Gerhard Kegel & Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem, On the Territoriality Principle in 
Public International Law, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 245, 250–51 (Joseph A. Darby 
trans., 1982). 
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legislation, i.e. the co-existence of two sets of norms: one governing 
domestic and the other governing international transactions or contracts.  
Sometimes the “international” rules stem from an international 
convention,102 but those rules may also be enacted at the domestic level.103  
Still, even if domestic laws incorporate — or attempt to incorporate — 
international standards, those rules may nevertheless lack the degree of 
uniformity desirable for international transactions.  In any event, they will 
have great difficulty in overcoming the psychological aspect of substantive 
neutrality. 
This being clarified, domestic laws fail to address the two specific needs 
of international business contracts.  First, domestic laws do not provide an 
appropriate solution for the problem of substantive neutrality.  In the 
majority of international commercial contracts, the parties will agree on the 
application of the law of one of them.  Less frequently, they will opt for the 
application of the law of a third country.  By doing so, the parties do 
manage to ensure the substantive neutrality of the applicable law.  However, 
in such a scenario, substantive neutrality comes at a cost: it entails the 
application of a law that both parties are largely unfamiliar with and that 
therefore entails the risk of having to face unforeseeable legal 
consequences.  In addition, there are a number of other practical difficulties 
arising from such a choice-of-law due to the potential dissociation between 
legislative and judicial competence104 and possible legislative restrictions on 
the parties’ right to select the law of a country that bears no material 
connection to the transaction.105 
Second, due to their focus on domestic legal relationships, domestic laws 
also prove unable to satisfy the increased need for party autonomy of 
international business transactions.  As I have explained above, domestic 
laws may contain at least three types of undue restrictions: restrictions on 
the parties’ ability to address questions arising only in the international 
context, restrictions on the possibility for the parties to effectively respond 
  
 102. Probably the best illustration of this is the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). This multiparty treaty replaces the 
domestic sales laws of a contracting state with respect to sales agreements covered by the 
Convention.  See generally United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, adopted Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (Jan. 1, 1988). 
 103. Numerous countries have adopted dualistic arbitration laws, i.e. laws that contain 
separate provisions for domestic arbitration, on the one side, and international arbitration, on 
the other.  
 104. When the parties opt for the application of a third law (the law of country A), 
they will not necessarily (not even generally) select the courts of country A as the competent 
forum.  Therefore, the competent court will often have to apply foreign law with which it 
will be largely unfamiliar. 
 105. Certain laws limit the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable substantive law 
by requiring that the law chosen (for example the country concerned) bear some connection 
to the dispute. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1562 (2006). 
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to the needs of increasingly complex transactions, and restrictions based on 
legislative policies aimed at protecting weaker parties. 
II. DEPARTURE FROM THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE APPLICATION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
The traditional conflict of laws approach does not represent an ideal 
method of solving conflicts arising in international commercial transactions.  
Although this state of affairs is by no means due to mistakes attributable to 
conflict scholars or domestic legislators, the conflict of laws continues to 
struggle with occasional unpredictability and questionable fairness.  Above 
all, the conflict of laws proves unable to provide a substantively adequate 
set of norms as domestic laws continue to lag behind economic reality. 
Over the past thirty years, arbitral tribunals deciding international 
business disputes have rather successfully attempted to remedy those 
shortcomings.  They have progressively freed themselves from “rigid” 
conflict of laws rules in order to improve, to the extent possible, the 
predictability and fairness of the determination of the applicable law.  They 
have also sought to take into account the specific normative needs of 
international dispute resolution and increasingly resorted to transnational 
law, rather than domestic laws. 
A. Departure from the Traditional Conflict of Laws Approach 
Since the early 1980’s, arbitral tribunals have enjoyed steadily increasing 
discretion in the determination of the applicable law, absent a choice of law 
by the parties.106  This trend found doctrinal support in the theory of 
delocalization107 of international arbitration, which is based on the “multi-
connectedness” of international arbitration proceedings and the fictitious 
character of the concept of the arbitral “seat” or “forum.”108  Roughly 
  
 106. See, for example, the French decree of May 12, 1981 on international arbitration 
(Articles 1492-1507 of the Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile), the 1985 UNCITRAL 
Model Law, and the 1987 Swiss Private International Law Statute, Articles 176-194. 
 107. The theory of delocalization rejects the traditional approach according to which 
all aspects of arbitration proceedings (the arbitration agreement, the arbitral procedure, and 
the arbitral award) are governed by the laws of the place of arbitration or arbitral “seat.” The 
localized Approach of arbitration has been argued by a number of scholars and, most 
famously, by Mann.  See F.A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION—
LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (P. Sanders ed., 1967).  An example of such an 
approach is provided by  ICC Case No. 5460, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–
1990, at 138 (S. Jarvin et al. eds., 1994).  However, it should be noted that, as a matter of 
positive law, the application of the laws of the seat has never been exclusive. 
 108. For a discussion of the progressive acceptance of the idea that international 
arbitration proceedings are devoid of a forum, see Marc Blessing, Regulations in Arbitration 
Rules on Choice of Law, in ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 7 PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION 
PROCEEDINGS/THE LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 391 (A.J. van den Berg 
ed., 1996). 
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speaking, proponents of this theory argue that the laws and courts of the 
arbitral seat or place of arbitration should not play a preponderant role.109  
Under a delocalized approach, the validity of the arbitration clause, the 
merits of the dispute, the arbitral procedure, and the “validity” of the arbitral 
award are thus not (necessarily) governed by the laws of the seat.  
Delocalization theory also implies that the conflict of laws rules of the seat 
do not apply to the determination of the applicable substantive law. 
Most contemporary arbitration laws have incorporated this delocalized 
approach.  They recognize that arbitrators are not bound by the ordinary 
conflict rules of the seat and grant them considerable powers to select the 
applicable law or rules of law.  The most restrictive of those laws require 
arbitral tribunals to apply the “rules of law with which the case is most 
closely connected.”110  Others grant arbitrators the power to resort to the 
conflict of laws rule they consider appropriate.111  Still others allow arbitral 
tribunals to apply any “rules of law” that they deem fit,112 a formulation that 
is generally considered to officially recognize the possibility of applying 
transnational law (which I will discuss later).  A similar trend characterizes 
the evolution of institutional arbitration rules such as those of the ICC, the 
LCIA or the AAA.113 
While it is uncontroversial that arbitrators do enjoy broad discretionary 
powers to determine the applicable law or rules of law, the determination of 
the ways in which they use those powers is more problematic.  In fact, when 
arbitral tribunals decide to apply a particular conflict of laws rule leading to 
the application of a given domestic law, they do not necessarily motivate 
their decisions.  In particular, they will often refrain from referring to 
considerations of substantive fairness, even if such considerations play a 
significant role in their decision-making process.  Also, in line with the 
traditional approach, many tribunals may not take into account the 
consequences of their conflict of laws decisions. 
However, some of the approaches followed by arbitral tribunals reveal a 
clear intent to improve the predictability and fairness of their choice-of-law 
  
 109. For a general discussion of the delocalization of international arbitration, see 
Pippa Read, Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration: Its Relevance in the 
New Millennium, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 177 (1999). 
 110. See, e.g., Swiss Private International Law Statute, art. 187 [hereinafter Swiss 
PIL]; Italian C.P.C., art. 834; German ZPO art. 1051(2). 
 111. See, e.g., U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L. [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON INT’L COM. ARB. at Art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Sales No. E.08.V.4 (1985) 
(amended 2006). This document has acted as the framework for numerous countries in their 
creation of international commercial arbitration laws. 
 112. See, e.g., Article 1496 of the French N.C.P.C and Article 1054(2) of the 1986 
Netherlands Arbitration Statute. 
 113. See ICC International Court of Arbitration, Rules of Arbitration, art 17(1), Jan. 
01, 1998, ICC No. 808 [hereinafter ICC Rules]; London Court of International Arbitration 
Rules, art. 22.3, Jan. 1. 1988 [hereinafter LCIA Rules]; American Arbitration Association 
Rules, art 28.1 [hereinafter AAA Rules]. 
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determinations.  Beyond those specific examples, which I will discuss 
below, it seems fairly reasonable to assume that, as a general rule, 
arbitrators use their discretion in ways that favor the common interests of 
the parties, i.e. the predictability of the choice-of-law process and, to the 
extent possible, substantive fairness. 
1. Efforts to Render the Operation of the Conflict of Laws 
More Predictable 
As I have shown in Part 1, factors reducing the predictability of the 
conflict of laws process include — excessive — methodological 
complexity, lex forism, and the lack of international uniformity of conflict 
rules.  While arbitral tribunals have largely avoided having recourse to 
methodological subtleties such as characterization, renvoi or adaptation, 
they have nevertheless encountered obstacles in the pursuit of greater 
predictability of their choice-of-law determinations.  On the other hand, 
they have — sometimes without any effort on their part — successfully 
battled lex forism and the international diversity of conflict rules. 
 
Obstacles to the Improvement of the Predictability of the Conflict of Laws 
 
At first sight, it seems difficult, if not impossible, for arbitrators to render 
the operation of the conflict of laws more “predictable.”  Several reasons 
account for this difficulty.  First, delocalization and broad discretionary 
powers in the determination of the applicable law may actually diminish the 
predictability of the law-selecting process.  In fact, since arbitrators are not 
bound to follow any particular set of conflict of laws rules, whether 
domestic or international, their freedom to determine the applicable law or 
rules of law is virtually unlimited.  A priori, this considerable discretion, 
renders arbitral choice-of-law determinations less foreseeable since 
increased judicial discretion generally favors fair outcomes in individual 
cases, but diminishes overall predictability.114  It may, in fact, seem illogical 
to argue that a non-rule should lead to more foreseeable results than a rule, 
however complex or vague.  The systematic application of the conflict of 
laws rules of the seat or of any “precise” conflict of laws rule that may be 
contained in the applicable arbitration law should, in principle, be easier to 
predict than the discretionary selection or “creation” of a conflict norm by 
an arbitral tribunal. 
  
 114. See Lando, supra note 3, at 512 (considering what type of conflict norms should 
be adopted: “Is a method to be adopted which insures justice in the individual case, a method 
which more or less will sacrifice the need for certainty and predictability – or are rules to be 
introduced which pay regard to the need for foreseeability and which if they are consistently 
applied will sometimes cause hardship in a particular case?”). 
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Second, one may wonder whether it is at all feasible to alter traditional 
conflict of laws rules to the effect of improving the predictability of their 
operation.  The very concept of predictability implies that the parties do 
have certain expectations with regard to the arbitrators’ decision on the 
applicable law.  However, where the parties are unable to reach an 
agreement on the applicable law, they probably have no specific 
expectations as to the decision an arbitral tribunal might render in a 
hypothetical dispute.  Also, and even more importantly, the parties may not 
have any “common” expectations with regard to the arbitral determination 
of the applicable law, and it is the arbitrators’ role to ensure that their 
decision is predictable for all parties involved. 
However, and despite those serious obstacles, arbitral tribunals have 
found ways to address two sources of unpredictability of the conflict of 
laws: lex forism and the lack of international uniformity of conflict of laws 
rules.  Contrary to State courts, arbitral tribunals have generally held that 
the place of arbitration does not constitute a “forum.”  Therefore, they have 
notshown a particular preference for the lex fori.  Also, arbitral tribunals 
have increasingly resorted to conflict of laws rules that are common to the 
parties’ respective countries or to conflict norms that reflect international 
standards.  By doing so, they have avoided the application of isolated or 
“unusual” conflict norms and thus increased of their choice-of-law 
decisions. 
 
The Absence of a Lex Fori: Arbitrators Do Not Generally Prefer the Law of 
the Place of Arbitration 
 
Two consequences follow from the general acceptance of delocalization 
theory and the resulting idea that arbitral tribunals do not have a lex fori.  
First, the predictability of their conflict of laws decisions is not likely to be 
diminished by lex forism.  An arbitral tribunal sitting in Geneva, for 
example, will not attempt to apply conflict rules in such way as to ensure to 
application of Swiss law.  Occasionally, arbitral tribunals — or rather the 
individual members — may have a preference for their “own” law, for 
example a French arbitrator may be inclined to prefer French law over, say, 
Italian law, but those instances are, in my opinion, relatively rare.  
Second, being deprived of a forum, arbitral tribunals will also be less 
inclined to act as “protectors” of public policy rules of that non-existent 
forum.  An arbitral tribunal sitting in Vienna and hearing a dispute between 
a Czech and a Spanish party will have little reason to take into account 
Austrian public policy.  The conflict of laws reasoning of arbitral tribunals 
will thus be less likely to be affected by public interests.  Those tribunals 
will therefore have more limited recourse to mandatory norms and the 
public policy exception. 
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Cumulative Application of Conflict Norms: Application of International 
Standards of the Conflict of Laws 
 
As I explained above, under the laws of most countries, arbitrators are 
not generally bound by the conflict norms of the seat.  If arbitrators apply a 
traditional conflict of laws reasoning, they may apply the conflict rules of 
the seat, those of the country of one of the parties or any other country 
connected to the transaction.  Those particular conflict of laws rules may 
follow an isolated or outdated approach that neither of the parties foresaw at 
the time of the conclusion of the agreement.  The relevant conflict rule may, 
for example, provide for the application of the law of the country in which 
the contract was entered into,115 which is a rather unusual — and 
unpredictable — rule in contemporary comparative conflict of laws. 
Arbitral tribunals have elaborated two methods to address this difficulty.  
The first such method consists in the cumulative application of the conflict 
of laws norms of the countries involved,116 which will typically be the 
countries of the parties’ respective residences or nationalities and the 
country or countries of performance.  Under this approach, arbitrators will 
apply the law that is designated by both (or all) conflict norms involved.  
Arbitral tribunals have, for example, cumulatively applied Irish and French 
conflict rules in a dispute between a French manufacturer and an Irish 
distributor,117 Italian and Tunisian conflict norms in a dispute between a 
Tunisian manufacturer and two Italian agents,118 and Egyptian, French, and 
Yugoslav conflict rules in a dispute between a Yugoslav seller and an 
Egyptian buyer.119 
Critics of this method have argued that it is of little practical usefulness 
since it can only be used where the conflict norms concerned are identical 
and since the result of the cumulative application of those conflict rules will 
thus not differ from the individual application of the conflict rules of either 
country.120  They claim that this approach aims to solve a so-called “false 
conflict.”121  In my opinion, those criticisms miss the point.  If a particular 
  
 115. An example of such a law is provided in ICC Case No. 6281 (the arbitral tribunal 
notes that under Egyptian conflict of laws rules, a contract is governed by the law of the 
country where the contract is signed, article 19 of the 1949 Civil Code).  See COLLECTION OF 
ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–1990, supra note 107, at 395. 
 116. Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129, 131 (1998) 
(stating that “[i]nstead of referring to just one conflict of law rule, they [arbitrators] justify 
their choice of law decision with reference to all conflict of laws rules concerned . . .”). 
 117. ICC Case No. 7319, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1996–2000, at 300, 
304 (J.J. Arnaldez et al. eds., 2003). 
 118. ICC Case No. 5118, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986-1990, supra 
note 107, at 318, 319. 
 119. Id. at 394, 399. 
 120. Wortmann, supra note 2, at 108. 
 121. Id. 
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law is applied as a result of the cumulative method, it is irrelevant that the 
application of the conflict laws of country A would have had the same 
effect.  The arbitral tribunal precisely applies a given law only because such 
law is designated by both (or all) conflict norms concerned.  The legitimacy 
of its application derives from the fact that the conflict rules are identical, 
not from any domestic conflict rule as such. 
The second method to tackle the predictability problem consists in the 
application of conflict norms that are widely recognized at the international 
level, i.e. in the application of what could be termed “general principles” of 
the conflict of laws.122  Such an approach may be used as an alternative to 
the cumulative method.  It bears particular usefulness when, due to 
divergences between the conflict norms involved, this latter method cannot 
be applied.  In fact, recourse to general principles of the conflict of laws 
does not necessarily suppose a convergence of the conflict rules involved 
(although this will frequently be the case).  This method therefore allows 
arbitrators to avoid the application of uncommon and hence unpredictable 
conflict of laws rules.  When following such an approach, arbitrators often 
apply the provisions of international instruments such as the Rome 
Convention or principles that derive from the arbitrators’ comparative 
conflict of laws analysis.123 
2. The Introduction of Considerations of Substantive Fairness 
into the Law-Selecting Process 
When arbitral tribunals are called upon to determine the applicable 
substantive law, they do not necessarily pursue substantive fairness; they 
may select the applicable law on the basis of other considerations or legal 
standards which they consider relevant.  However, when they do attempt to 
increase the substantive fairness of their choice-of-law decisions, they do 
not generally disclose their underlying motivation.  Rather than stating that 
the application of law A leads to a “fairer” result than the application of law 
B, they would confine themselves to observing that law A is the more 
appropriate or “suitable” for the case at stake.  However, as I suggested with 
respect to the pursuit of greater predictability of choice-of-law decisions, it 
is reasonable to assume that arbitral tribunals use their almost unlimited 
  
 122. See, for example, ICC Case No.7205 (application of the law of the country in 
which the party that effects the characteristic performance has its central administration). 
COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1991-1995, 622 (J.J. Arnaldez et al. eds., 1997). 
 123. See, e.g., id. (applying the law of the country in which the party that effects the 
characteristic performance has its central administration); ICC Case No. 4996, COLLECTION 
OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–1990, supra note 107, at 292, 294 (presiding arbitral 
tribunal takes into account various international conventions, including the Rome 
Convention, in order to decide that the law of the place of performance — which is also the 
country where the party that is to effect the characteristic performance has its habitual 
residence — should apply). 
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discretion in ways that increase the substantive fairness of their decisions.  
Indeed, it can be assumed that the various methodological approaches 
elaborated by arbitral tribunals seek to ensure such fairness.  This is notably 
confirmed by explicit references to substantive fairness contained in choice-
of-law determinations aimed at ensuring the validity of the contract or at 
complying with the parties’ legitimate expectations. 
 
Overview of Methodological Approaches 
 
Under the laws of most countries and the rules of the major arbitral 
institutions, absent a choice-of-law by the parties, arbitral tribunals enjoy 
wide discretionary powers in the determination of the applicable law.124  In 
their exercise of those powers, arbitrators have developed three main 
methodological approaches.  First, arbitrators may decide to determine the 
applicable law by having recourse to what they consider the “most 
appropriate” conflict of laws rule.  Under such an approach, arbitral 
tribunals apply an “existing” conflict rule, whether contained in a domestic 
law or in an international convention.  Second, arbitrators may disregard all 
domestic and international conflict of laws norms and decide to “create” 
their own conflict rule (for example, the cumulative method).  Third, 
arbitrators may also “directly” apply a particular domestic law without any 
reference to a conflict of laws norm, whether existing or created ad hoc.  
In actual practice, those approaches considerably overlap and are not 
always easily distinguished.  For instance, an arbitral tribunal may decide 
that the cumulative application of the conflict norms of the parties’ 
respective laws constitutes the “most appropriate” conflict rule.125  
Arbitrators may even hold that the most appropriate conflict rule is the one 
that provides for the cumulative application of the substantive laws 
involved.126  Similarly, when arbitrators decide to create their “own” 
conflict norm, they may in fact directly select the applicable law without 
referring to any specific conflict of laws reasoning.127  
Despite some degree of incoherence in the actual application of the 
methodological approaches outlined above, the elaboration of those 
methods signals a trend towards ever increasing discretion of arbitral 
tribunals in the law-selecting process.  In fact, those tribunals are “freed” 
from all domestic and international conflict of laws norms and can apply 
any domestic law they deem suitable, even without stating reasons.  This 
  
 124. See supra notes 113–23. 
 125. ICC Case No. 2626, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974–1985, at 318 
(Y. Derains & S. Jarvin eds., 1990). 
 126. ICC Case No. 2886, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974–1985, supra 
note 125, at 332. 
 127. ICC Case No. 3880, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974–1985, supra 
note 125, at 463. 
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virtually unlimited discretion provides arbitral tribunals with the means to 
take into account considerations of substantive fairness. 
 
The Application of Laws Upholding the Validity of the Parties’ Agreement 
and Complying with the Parties’ Substantive Expectations 
 
In a number of cases, the application of one of the laws involved may 
threaten the validity of the parties’ agreement.  In some cases, such 
invalidity may be considered as appropriate and “fair.”  This will be the 
case when the contract is illegal or violates international public policy.  In 
many other cases, though, the invalidity of the contract may be considered 
as “unfair,” notably when such invalidity results from unduly restrictive 
validity requirements, such as specific formal requirements, for example.128  
As I have explained above, those requirements may be appropriate in a 
domestic context, but they unduly restrict party autonomy at the 
international level.  
Arbitral tribunals have, in various instances, motivated their choice-of-
law decisions by the need to uphold the validity of the parties’ contract.  In 
an interim award rendered in 1983, an ICC tribunal decided to apply Swiss 
law rather than the laws of the Arab claimant on the grounds that the 
application of such laws “might partially or totally affect the validity of the 
Agreement” and that it was “reasonable to assume that from two possible 
laws, the parties would choose the law which would uphold the validity of 
the Agreement.”129  In 1985, another ICC tribunal held that an agency 
agreement concluded between an Italian company and a French agent 
should be governed by French rather than Italian law, inter alia because the 
Italian law requirement according to which all commercial agents need to be 
registered in Italy would have unduly invalidated the parties’ contract.130  
Arbitral tribunals have applied such reasoning not only to issues of 
contract validity strictly speaking, but also to the application of statutes of 
limitation potentially preventing a party from bringing a claim.  In 1993, an 
ICC tribunal hearing a dispute between a French and an Algerian party 
chose to apply Algerian rather than French law on the grounds that  the 
application of French law might have led to the claimant’s claim being 
time-barred, which, since the respondent had filed a counter-claim, would 
have been prejudicial to both parties.131 
  
 128. ICC Case No. 4996, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–1990, supra 
note 107, at 293. 
 129. ICC Case No. 4145, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–1990, supra 
note 107, at 53, 57. 
 130. ICC Case No. 4996, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–1990, supra 
note 107. 
 131. ICC Case No. 7154, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1991–1995, supra 
note 122, at 555. 
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Admittedly, this favor validitatis found in arbitral decisions is not a 
unique to international arbitration.  It can be found in a number of 
jurisdictions, and notably in those countries that apply the Rome 
Convention.132  However, arbitral tribunals were able to validate contracts 
where the favor validitatis rule contained in the Rome Convention or other 
conflicts laws were not “normally” applicable.  In particular, as the cases 
reported above indicate, they were able to render such decisions prior to the 
entry into force of the Convention.133  
One — if not the main — reason why arbitral tribunals render choice-of-
law decisions favoring the validity of the parties’ contract is that the parties 
expect their contract to be valid.  In other words, the validity of the contract 
conforms to the parties’ legitimate expectations.134  If the issue of contract 
validity provides a particularly insightful example, it is not the only instance 
in which arbitral tribunals take the parties’ legitimate expectations into 
account. 
In fact, in an attempt to render fairer decisions, arbitral tribunals have not 
only taken into account the parties’ substantive expectations (notably 
regarding the validity of their contract), but also conflict of laws 
expectations.  This is well illustrated by a 1988 decision in which an ICC 
tribunal hearing a dispute between several European claimants and a 
number of Tunisian respondents decided to apply, to the extent possible, 
trade usages and rules that are common to French and Tunisian law, 
observing that such a decision conforms to the parties’ legitimate 
expectations.135 
Arbitral tribunals have even taken into account the parties’ expectations 
when deciding on the application of mandatory norms.  In 1995, an ICC 
tribunal hearing a dispute between an American and a Belgian party had to 
solve the question of whether the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization) Act was applicable to the dispute which the parties had 
subjected to New York law.  The tribunal decided that RICO did not apply 
because, absent a choice-of-law by the parties, the dispute would be 
governed by Belgian law (the law of the place of performance).136  The 
tribunal based its decision inter alia on the necessity to comply with the 
parties’ expectations and to ensure predictability.137 
  
 132. Rome Convention, supra note 86, art. 8 (material validity), art. 9 (formal 
validity). 
 133. See supra notes 125–31. 
 134. ICC Case No. 4145, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–1990, supra 
note 107. 
 135. ICC Case No. 5103, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–1990, supra 
note 107, at 361. 
 136. ICC Case No. 8385, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1996–2000, supra 
note 117, at 474. 
 137. Id. 
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B. The Application of Transnational Law 
As I have explained above, arbitral tribunals, with a view to improving 
the predictability and fairness of the operation of the conflict of laws, have 
subjected the traditional conflicts approach to a number of methodological 
transformations.  However, those developments do not alter one essential 
feature of the classical conflict of laws theory, namely the fact that the 
applicable law will always be the domestic law of a particular country.  
Those modifications do not, therefore, allow arbitral tribunals to adequately 
respond to the specific normative needs of international commercial 
relations. 
This is why, in addition to the evolution taking place at the conflict of 
laws level, arbitral tribunals have moved away from the strict application of 
domestic laws towards the application of “transnational” law.138  This trend 
constitutes a quantum leap in international dispute resolution: arbitral 
tribunals do no longer modify how the applicable domestic law is 
determined; their decisions affect the substance of what the applicable law 
is. 
1. Transnational Law as a Means to Ensure Substantive 
Neutrality and Increased Party Autonomy 
The exact meaning of transnational law139 is the subject of some 
controversy and attempts to define this notion are rather sparse.  A little less 
than twenty years ago, even distinguished international lawyers such as 
Paulsson viewed transnational law (lex mercatoria) with skepticism.140 
Paulsson distinguished three approaches or conceptions of transnational 
law: (i) an autonomous legal order, (ii) a set of rules governing international 
contracts (very much like domestic laws) or (iii) a number of trade practices 
and usages.  Paulsson himself subscribed to the latter, most restrictive, 
approach.141 
Such a restrictive view is no longer sustainable in light of the growing 
number of decisions in which arbitral tribunals have expressly subjected 
international contracts to transnational law.  Lex mercatoria must thus be 
considered as a body of rules capable of governing international business 
transactions.  In an attempt to define this concept of transnational law 
further, a number of authors have emphasized the private, as opposed to 
  
 138. See Cremades & Plehn, supra note 92, at 347. 
 139. The term “transnational law” is generally attributed to Jessup.  See P. C. JESSUP, 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (this author adopts a particularly broad definition of 
transnational law stating that it “is all law which regulates actions or events that transcend 
national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules 
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”). 
 140. See Paulsson, supra note 18. 
 141. Id. at 69. 
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public, “source” of transnational law.142  Others have stressed the fact that 
transnational law is constituted by rules that “transcend” national 
boundaries.143  The writings of various scholars include, to some extent, 
both definitional approaches.144 
Under the first approach, transnational law is characterized by the private 
origin of its rules, i.e. the fact that those rules are not enacted by States, but 
adopted “spontaneously” by the international business community itself 
(self-regulation).  Such a definition thus essentially views transnational law 
as commercial customs and practices.  To the extent that those practices and 
customs may be codified in international uniform law conventions, such a 
definition also includes those uniform laws. 
Under the second approach, transnational law is defined by reference to 
the nature of its rules: transnational law rules are rules that “transcend” 
national boundaries, i.e. rules that are common to all or a certain 
(significant) number of legal systems.  Under such a definition, the actual 
source of a particular rule is irrelevant.  Transnational law may notably 
include rules contained in domestic laws and international (inter-
governmental) conventions, provided that those rules are widely applied at 
the international level. 
Defining transnational law by reference to the nature of its rules is the 
more adequate approach.  Indeed, the “private source” criteria is 
incompatible with the fact that a number of legal norms anchored in 
domestic legal systems (such as general principles of law) or derived from 
international law (such as uniform law conventions) are generally 
considered to form part of transnational law,145 — even by those who argue 
that lex mercatoria is characterized by its private origin.  Also, and most 
  
 142. This is notably inherent in Goldman’s understanding of the lex mercatoria. See 
Goldman, Nouvelles réflexions sur la lex mercatoria, supra note 14, at 244 (translation by 
the author) (arguing that “transnational principles, rules and usages,” rather than being 
imposed by state or interstate authorities, are “formed spontaneously in the course of the 
conclusion or functioning of these [international economic relations]”). 
 143. See, e.g., Norbert Horn, Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of International 
Commercial Contracts, in THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS VOL. 2, 3, 12 (N. Horn & C.M. Schmitthoff eds., 1982). 
 144. Schmitthoff, for example, expressly states that transnational law comprises what 
he terms “international legislation” and international commercial custom. See Clive 
Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions, 
supra note 14, at 23. 
 145. See, e.g., David W. Rivkin, Enforceability of Arbitral Awards based on Lex 
Mercatoria, 9 ARB. INT’L 67, 67 (1993) (stating that lex mercatoria is “an amalgam of most 
globally-accepted principles which govern international commercial relations: public 
international law, certain uniform laws, general principles of law, rules of international 
organizations, customs and usages of international trade, standard form contracts, and arbitral 
case law”); Horn, supra note 143, at 67 (stating that transnational law includes international 
conventions, semi-official texts such as the UNIDROIT principles and non-codified 
principles of transnational law as recognized by courts and arbitral tribunals and used by 
lawyers when drafting international contracts). 
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importantly, the distinction between private and public sources of rules is 
not conceptually accurate and to a large extent merely “formal”: while 
certain rules are formally enacted by domestic legislators or adopted by 
international conventions, they may merely codify existing usages and 
customs followed in actual business practice. 
Rules of transnational law are thus rules that “transcend” national 
boundaries.  They are “common” to a certain number of legal systems146 and 
are, to this extent, “uniform” rules.147  It is this uniformity of transnational 
law rules that explains why those rules support party autonomy and 
substantive neutrality.  Uniform rules are substantively neutral because they 
are “common” to the laws of the parties or, at the very least, do not privilege 
the approaches and rules contained in either of those laws.148 
Due to its uniformity, a rule of transnational law also frees parties to an 
international transaction from domestic technicalities,149 and thereby grants 
them increased contractual freedom.  In fact, rules containing particular 
“undue” restrictions on party autonomy differ from one country to another 
and will not be common to the parties’ respective legal systems, nor, a 
fortiori, to a large number of those systems.  A rule requiring a buyer to 
immediately notify the seller upon arrival of the goods in order to preserve 
its right to bring a claim on the basis of the late delivery,150 or a rule laying 
down severe restrictions on the ability of an agent to bind a corporation,151 
for example, will be found only in few legal systems, and can thus be 
avoided by the application of transnational norms. 
2. Progressive Move Towards the Application of Transnational 
Law 
Legislative Context Favoring the Application of Transnational Law in 
International Arbitration 
 
  
 146. In order to qualify as a rule of transnational law, a rule should generally be 
followed in a “significant” number of countries.  However, the “uniformity” of a particular 
norm may also be limited to the parties’ respective legal systems.  Such limited uniformity 
allows arbitral tribunals to apply rules that are common to those legal systems. 
 147. Stoecker, supra note 16, at 101 (stating that “[t]he idea behind such a uniform 
law [transnational law] is to get around the conflict of law question as there is only supposed 
to be one possible law to apply”). 
 148. The success of the UNIDROIT Principles is sometimes attributed to their 
substantive “neutrality.”  See Berger, supra note 22. 
 149. Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 748 (1985). 
 150. Id. at 753.  Lando demonstrates the usefulness of the recourse to transnational 
law by the example of a sale of goods contract concluded between a Danish seller and a 
German buyer, showing that it allows arbitrators to avoid the excessively restrictive Danish 
law provision. 
 151. See Lowenfeld, supra note 91, at 138. 
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If arbitral tribunals have been successful in formulating and applying 
rules of transnational law, their ability to do so has rested, at least in part, on 
a favorable legislative context (in a broad sense): on the one hand, arbitral 
tribunals have benefited from the formal recognition by domestic legislators 
of their right to have recourse to such rules; on the other hand, they have 
taken advantage of the availability of sets of transnational rules elaborated 
by formulating agencies.  Arbitral tribunals, therefore, not only have the 
right, but also improved means, to apply transnational law. 
The recognition of the right of arbitrators to apply transnational law 
forms part of the general legislative tendency to increase arbitral 
“autonomy.”152  The acceptance of such autonomy has allowed arbitral 
tribunals (and parties) to largely escape State interference during the various 
stages of the arbitral proceedings (conclusion of the arbitration agreement, 
conduct of the proceedings, and enforcement of the award).  It has also 
granted arbitral tribunals increasing autonomy with regard to the 
determination of the applicable substantive law and opened the door to the 
application of transnational law. 
Although arbitral tribunals have had recourse to rules of transnational 
law prior to such enactments, their power to do so has been officially 
recognized by a number of arbitration statutes adopted since the early 
1980s.153  Those laws have empowered arbitral tribunals to apply the “rules 
of law” that they consider appropriate, an expression that has signaled 
acceptance of transnational law.  The most recent versions of the rules of 
the major arbitration institutions, including the ICC, LCIA, and AAA, 
confirm this trend.154  The courts of numerous countries have enforced 
arbitration awards based on lex mercatoria.155 
Although numerous contemporary arbitration laws grant arbitral 
tribunals the right to apply transnational law, they do not provide any 
guidance as to what transnational law consists of or how it can be 
determined.  Arbitrators are thus faced with the difficult task of 
“identifying” or “formulating” rules of transnational law.  This task has 
been facilitated by the works of a number of governmental (such as 
UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT) and non-governmental (such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce) institutions pursuing the progressive 
unification of the law of international trade.156  Indeed, the efforts of those 
institutions have led to the adoption of legal texts formulating or codifying 
  
 152. See PETSCHE, supra note 21. 
 153. See Article 1496 of the French N.C.P.C ; Swiss PIL, supra note 110, art. 187(1); 
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Dutch Code of Civil Procedure), art. 1054(2); 
and Article 813 of the Lebanese Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile. 
 154. Supra note 113. 
 155. See Rivkin, supra note 145 (examining more particularly enforceability of lex 
mercatoria awards in the UK, France, and the United States). 
 156. See Franco Ferrari, Defining the Sphere of Application of the 1994 “UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts”, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1225 (1995). 
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uniform legal rules or usages, whether confined to a particular type of 
transaction or of more general application.  
 
Actual Application of Transnational Law 
 
Arbitral tribunals have resorted to transnational law in the absence of a 
choice of law by the parties.  They have sometimes applied transnational 
law without further specifying the nature or origin of the rules concerned.  
More often, they have applied particular “branches” of transnational law, 
including notably the tronc commun, general principles of law, transnational 
law codifications such as the UNIDROIT Principles, and trade usages.  
Interestingly, arbitral tribunals have applied transnational law not only in 
the absence of a choice-of-law clause concluded by the parties, but also 
when the parties expressly submitted their agreement to a particular 
domestic law.  
Arbitral choice-of-law determinations selecting lex mercatoria as the 
applicable law in the absence of a party choice date back at least to the late 
1970’s.157  Since then, numerous tribunals have found the application of 
transnational law to be the most appropriate solution in an international 
context.158  They have sometimes construed the parties’ failure to agree on 
the applicable law as an indicator of the parties’ intention not to subject 
their agreement to any domestic law.159  Some tribunals have even affirmed 
that the application of lex mercatoria is the “only possible solution” in an 
international context.160  Others have taken a more conservative approach 
and chosen to apply transnational law in conjunction with domestic law or 
laws.161 
Arbitrators have quite frequently resorted to the so-called tronc commun 
method,162 an approach consisting of the cumulative application of the 
  
 157. See Award, Nov. 3, 1977, 1980 REV. ARB. 560. It should however be observed 
that, in this case, the arbitrators were acting as amiables compositeurs. 
 158. See, e.g., ICC Case No. 3540 (award of Oct. 3, 1980), Y.B. COM. ARB. VOL. VII 
124 (1982); ICC Case No. 3131 (the “Norsolor” case), Y.B. COM. ARB. VOL. IX 109 (1984); 
ICC Case No. 5953 (partial award of Sept. 1, 1988), 1990 REV. ARB. 701; ICC Case No. 
8486, Y.B. COM. ARB. VOL. XXIVA 162 (1999); ICC Case No. 9246 (award of Mar. 8, 1996), 
Y.B. COM. ARB. VOL. XXII 28 (1997). 
 159. ICC Case No. 3131, Y.B. COM. ARB. VOL. IX, supra note 158, at 110 (holding 
that in the absence of a choice-of-law clause, the drafting of the parties’ agreement did not 
reveal a sufficiently clear intent to “localize” the contract).  
 160. ICC Case No. 5953, supra note 158, at 712. 
 161. See ICC Case No. 3540, supra note 158, at 129 (the arbitral tribunal states that it 
will examine whether “the solution contained in its award based on the lex mercatoria… 
would be fundamentally different from national law”); ICC Case No. 8486, Y.B. COM. ARB. 
VOL. XXIVA, supra 158 (applying Dutch law in light of the UNIDROIT Principles and 
international contractual and arbitral practice). 
 162. On the tronc commun doctrine in general, see Ancel, The Tronc Commun 
Doctrine: Logics and Experience in International Arbitration, 7 J.INT.ARB. 3, 65 (1990); 
 
490 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:3 
 
parties’ respective laws.  The tronc commun method has proven particularly 
useful in the context of State contracts since the unbalance between the 
respective positions of the parties increases the need for substantive 
neutrality.163  As the well-known Aminoil arbitration illustrates,164 
considerations of substantive neutrality have sometimes prompted parties to 
contractually provide for the application of rules common to their respective 
legal systems.165 
The tronc commun method has also been resorted to by arbitral tribunals 
deciding disputes between private parties.  Arbitral tribunals have, for 
example, decided to apply the rules common to Belgian and Italian law in a 
dispute involving an Italian patent holder and a Belgian manufacturer,166 the 
rules common to Yugoslav and German law in a dispute involving a 
commercial agency agreement concluded between a German and a 
Yugoslav party,167 and the rules common to French and Tunisian law in a 
dispute between several European buyers and a number of Tunisian 
sellers.168 
Despite its apparent simplicity, the practical application of the tronc 
commun method can be problematic.  Indeed, the relevant rules of the legal 
systems concerned may be dissimilar and it may thus be impossible to 
determine any “common rules” to solve a particular legal question.  This is 
why arbitral tribunals frequently decide to apply the tronc commun only 
once they have established that the relevant rules are in fact identical.  The 
practical difficulties associated with the tronc commun method, as well as 
the growing availability of transnational law codifications, have caused 
arbitral tribunals to be increasingly reluctant to follow this approach. 
In a number of cases, arbitral tribunals have decided to apply 
transnational law in the form of general principles of law or as a body of 
norms potentially comprising various sources of transnational law.  In a 
case reported by Derains, an ICC Tribunal hearing a dispute between a 
Japanese manufacturer and a Middle Eastern distributor, decided that the 
parties’ contract should be governed by “principles of international business 
  
Rubino-Sammartano, Le Tronc Commun des lois nationales en présence (réflexion sur le 
droit applicable par l’arbitre international), 1987 CLUNET 133 (1987). 
 163. See Rivkin, supra note 145, at 67 (stating that “in contracts between a private 
company and a governmental entity, no state law is likely to be ideal”). 
 164. Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil), 21 I.L.M 976 (Mar. 1984). 
 165. In this case, the parties had agreed that their agreements should be governed by 
“principles common to the laws of Kuwait and of the State of New York” and, in the absence 
of such common principles, by “the principles of law normally recognized by civilized 
states.”  
 166. ICC Case No. 2272, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974–1985, supra 
note 125, at 11. 
 167. ICC Case No. 2886, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974–1985, supra 
note 125, at 332. 
 168. ICC Case No. 5103, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986–1990, supra 
note 107, at 361. 
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law.”169  In a 1995 decision, another ICC Tribunal decided to apply “what is 
more and more called lex mercatoria” on the grounds that “the application 
of international principles of law offers many advantages” and that such 
principles “take into account the particular needs of international 
relations.”170 
Since their adoption in 1994, arbitral tribunals have on numerous 
occasions applied, or referred to, the UNIDROIT Principles.  Although 
scholars and arbitral tribunals are divided on the question of whether those 
Principles constitute transnational law strictly speaking,171 a number of 
tribunals have held that the parties’ agreement shall be governed by those 
Principles, either exclusively or in combination with other sources of 
transnational law.  Arbitral tribunals have also resorted to the Principles as a 
means of interpreting and supplementing the applicable domestic law.172 
Although they are relevant only for a limited number of aspects of an 
international business relationship, trade usages constitute a vital part of 
transnational law.  In fact, arbitral tribunals frequently decide issues brought 
before them on the basis of such usages.  According to experienced 
arbitrators, trade usages and practices play a significant role in the majority 
of international business disputes.173  Those international customs and 
usages are subject to a codification process similar to the one characterizing 
other “branches” of transnational law. 
Arbitral tribunals have applied rules of transnational law not only in the 
absence of a choice-of-law clause concluded by the parties, but sometimes 
  
 169. Derains, supra note 59, at 43, 47.  
 170. THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 228 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001) 
(quoting ICC Case No. 8385). 
 171. This is mainly due to the fact that the UNIDROIT Principles do not only aim to 
codify existing general principles of contract law, but also to lay down rules that their 
drafters considered as particularly appropriate in an international context, even if such rules 
are not, or not yet, widely recognized. Authors who take the view that the Principles form 
part of lex mercatoria include, for example, Lalive.  See P. Lalive, L’arbitrage international 
et les Principes UNIDROIT, in CONTRATTI COMMERCIALI INTERNAZIONALI E PRINCIPI 
UNIDROIT 71, 80 (M. Bonell & F. Bonelli eds., 1997).  The opposite view is expressed, for 
example, by van Houtte. See Hans van Houtte, UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and International Commercial Arbitration: Their Reciprocal 
Relevance, in UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: A NEW 
LEX MERCATORIA?, ICC Publication No. 490/1, at 181, 184 (1995).  Arbitral awards holding 
that the UNIDROIT Principles constitute a source of transnational law include, for example, 
ICC Case No. 7110 (partial awards), 10(2) ICC BULL. 39 (1999) and ICC Case No. 8261, 1 
UNIFORM L. REV. 171 (1999).  For a decision implying that the UNIDROIT Principles do not 
yet constitute transnational law, see ICC Case No. 7375, 2 UNIFORM L. REV. 598 (1997). 
 172. François Dessemontet, L’utilisation des Principes UNIDROIT dans le cadre de 
la pratique contractuelle et de l’activité arbitrale—L’exemple de la Suisse, in THE UNIDROIT 
PRINCIPLES 2004: THEIR IMPACT ON CONTRACTUAL PRACTICE, JURISPRUDENCE AND 
CODIFICATION 159, 161 (Eleanor Cashin Ritaine & Eva Lein eds., 2007).  
 173. See, e.g., Aksen, supra note 56, at 470 (stating that “in almost every international 
arbitration experience . . . custom and usage has played a prominent part in deciding the 
substance of the dispute”). 
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also where the parties have selected the applicable law.  According to 
Derains, arbitrators do so in order to fill gaps or supplement the applicable 
domestic law.174  In both cases, such an application of transnational law 
rules is in reality unnecessary and, strictly speaking, legally wrong.  
However, it illustrates the growing acceptance of the idea that transnational 
law is the most appropriate body of law to govern international commercial 
relationships. 
Arbitral tribunals arguably resort to transnational law principles in order 
to “fill gaps” in the applicable domestic law.  This point of view is 
debatable.  In fact, each domestic legal system contains rules governing 
gap-filling,175 and recourse to transnational rules does not appear to be 
necessary.  Moreover, the idea that the general and rather vague principles 
of transnational law should provide answers to questions that are left open 
in domestic legal systems (which contain infinitely more detailed norms) is 
puzzling.  As one of the examples provided by Derains illustrates,176 the 
reality of the gap-filling function of transnational law is slightly different: 
arbitral tribunals rely on rules of transnational law, despite the fact that they 
could have resorted to domestic rules having a comparable legal effect. 
Similarly, when arbitrators “supplement” the applicable domestic law, 
they apply a transnational rule that is identical or similar to a domestic rule.  
They would, for example, apply the “general principle of international 
business law”177 according to which parties have to perform a contract in 
good faith, rather than refer to the good faith principle found in the 
applicable domestic law.  This “preference” for transnational law indicates 
that arbitral tribunals, and probably also parties to international business 
disputes, perceive the application of transnational law as more legitimate 
than the application of a particular domestic law.  It provides additional 
support for the view that transnational law constitutes the most appropriate 
body of rules for international commercial transactions. 
CONCLUSION 
The traditional conflict of laws method undeniably fails adequately to 
respond to the specific normative requirements of international commercial 
transactions.  The principal weaknesses of the conflict method include the 
limited predictability and questionable fairness of its choice-of-law 
determinations and, more fundamentally, the inadequacy of the applicable 
  
 174. Derains, supra note 59, at 48. 
 175. See NICOLE KORNET, CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND GAP FILLING: 
COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES (2006). 
 176. Derains provides the example of arbitral tribunals applying the transnational rule 
according to which a party is under a duty to mitigate damages, although they could have 
applied the French law notion of causality in order to reach the same result. See Derains, 
supra note 59, at 49. 
 177. Id. 
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(domestic) substantive law.  As I have shown, international arbitral 
tribunals, which constitute the preferred fora for international business 
dispute resolution, have managed successfully to address part of these 
defects by developing a series of innovative methodological approaches.  
On the one hand, they have introduced “adjustments” to the classical 
conflict method and formulated new conflict rules (cumulative application 
of the conflict norms involved, application of general principles of conflict 
of laws etc.).  On the other hand, they have occasionally rejected the basic 
precept of the conflict approach — which is the solving of a “conflict” 
between competing laws and the selection of the applicable law — by 
applying transnational law to the merits of the dispute, rather than a 
particular domestic law. 
For the purposes of this article, the analysis ends here.  However, the 
observations and conclusions that I have formulated may give rise to 
additional questions, which may be the subject of further reflection.  First, 
one may ask whether the conflict of laws evolution that has taken place in 
the context of international commercial arbitration will eventually affect the 
way in which domestic State courts handle conflict issues.  If the more 
flexible approaches elaborated by arbitral tribunals are indeed superior to 
the classical method, then domestic courts hearing international commercial 
disputes may be inclined to follow suit.  Second, adopting a more critical 
view of arbitral choice-of law determinations, one may ask whether, and to 
what extent, the increased discretion that arbitral tribunals are enjoying with 
respect to conflict of laws issues leads to arbitrary decisions, rather than 
rulings that aim to improve predictability, fairness, and substantive 
adequacy. 
  

